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MANIFEST DISREGARD IN ARBITRATION 
AWARDS:                                                             
A MANIFESTATION OF APPEALS VERSUS A 
DISREGARD FOR JUST RESOLUTIONS 
Kate Kennedy∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the years, there has been an increase in judicial review of 
arbitration awards under the manifest disregard of the law 
doctrine.1 This practice has whittled away the finality for which 
arbitration is known and valued,2 and diminished its allure as a 
quick and inexpensive method of dispute resolution.3 What makes 
this practice even more detrimental to the future of arbitration is 
that the standard used to grant judicial review varies tremendously 
between circuits.4 This inconsistency was recently exhibited in 
                                                           
 ∗ Brooklyn Law School Class of 2008; B.A. Carleton College, 2003. The 
author wishes to thank Victoria Szymczak for introducing her to this topic as 
well as Susanne Flanders, Nicholas Reiter, and Nicole Roodhuyzen for their 
encouragement and editing expertise. 
 1 The manifest disregard doctrine, arising out of Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953), has now been adopted in some 
variation in every federal circuit. See Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So. 
2d 27, 59-61 (2004) (identifying representative manifest disregard cases from 
each of the federal circuits).    
2 Ronald J. Hedges, Arbitration Developments and Trends, SL081 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 1643, 1649 (2006). 
3 See Lou Whiteman, Arbitration’s Fall from Grace, LAW.COM, July 13, 
2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp?id=1152695125655. 
4 Marcus Mungioli, The Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard: A 
Vehicle for Modernization of the Federal Arbitration Act, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
1079, 1080 (2000) (citing Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 
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decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and the Eleventh 
Circuits wherein it became clear that the variance between the 
standards used to evaluate manifest disregard claims had reached a 
critical level: what the Eleventh Circuit sanctions as an unwarranted 
appeal may be reviewed and overturned on grounds of manifest 
disregard by the Fourth Circuit.5 
This discrepancy creates an atmosphere of uncertainty in the 
law and the field of arbitration. Lawyers and their clients are at a 
disadvantage when deciding whether to arbitrate because they are 
unable to predict whether it will serve its purpose or only add to 
the time and expense of resolving the claim.6 This situation casts a 
shadow on the future of arbitration and leaves scholars wondering 
whether the use of arbitration will “plateau,”7 whether arbitration 
will continue to be abused by “poor losers,”8 or whether a 
consistent standard of review will be implemented allowing 
arbitration to become the reliable and predictable method of quick 
and inexpensive dispute resolution as was originally intended.9 
This Note will examine two recent decisions by the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals10 and the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
                                                           
752, 761–62 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
5 Compare B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905 
(11th Cir. 2006) (refusing to vacate an arbitration award and threatening 
sanctions for future appeals that are not based on a record which demonstrates 
that the arbitrator knew the applicable law and ignored it; the reasonableness of 
the arbitrator’s analysis in arriving at an award is not considered), with Patten v. 
Signator Ins. Agency, 441 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2006) (granting review and 
vacating an arbitrator’s award because it was an unreasonable act to carry the 
one-year statute of limitations from the first contract over to the second). 
6 Cf. David Boohaker, The Addition of the “Manifest Disregard of the 
Law” Defense to Georgia’s Arbitration Code and Potential Conflicts with 
Federal Law, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 501, 522 (2004) (The author’s assertion 
that the Georgia State Courts’ adoption of the federal two-prong test of manifest 
disregard will result in arbitration being less outcome determinative because the 
courts will have to choose factors and tests to evaluate the two prongs can be 
seen as a reflection of the current state of affairs in the federal circuits). 
7 Whiteman, supra note 3. 
8 Hedges, supra note 2, at 1648. 
9 Norman S. Poser, Arbitration: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: 
Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471, 518 (1998). 
10 Patten, 441 F.3d 230. 
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Appeals11 in which the “courts seem to have gone in opposite 
directions in applying the [manifest disregard] standard.”12 
However, rather than interpreting these decisions as the emergence 
of a split amongst circuits, this Note proposes that the apparent 
conflict is actually the manifestation of inconsistent analyses 
applied to the same standard. Further, this Note argues that this is 
the inevitable result of the lack of a coherent model for courts to 
follow when appealed to on the grounds of manifest disregard, an 
often-used common law mechanism for appealing arbitration 
awards.13 
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of the history of 
arbitration, the benefits and detriments to using this method of 
alternative dispute resolution, and the expanding role of arbitration 
in today’s world. Part II will focus on a common method used to 
appeal arbitration decisions—that is, arguing that the arbitrator 
manifestly disregarded the law.14 It will examine the role that the 
manifest disregard doctrine plays in arbitration and in elevating 
arbitration disputes to the courts. Specifically, this Note will look 
at the manifest disregard doctrine in the context of two recent 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuit cases that have applied the standard 
with strikingly different methods. Part III will discuss the policy 
implications of the inconsistent application of the manifest 
disregard standard in the context of domestic law. It will also 
further examine the side effects of this inconsistency, such as an 
increase in unjustified appeals and forum-shopping. Finally, part 
IV will conclude that it is time for the Supreme Court to intercede 
and assert a clear and defined standard for the circuits to use when 
deciding whether to review an arbitration award on the grounds of 
manifest disregard. 
                                                           
11 B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 
2006). 
12 Lawrence W. Newman & David Zaslowsky, ‘Manifest Disregard’ in 
International Arbitration, N.Y.L.J., July 31, 2006, at 3. 
13 See James M. Gaitis, International and Domestic Arbitration Procedure: 
The Need for a Rule Providing a Limited Opportunity for Arbitral 
Reconsideration of Reasoned Awards, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 9, 47 (2004). 
14 Id. 
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I. ARBITRATION’S SCOPE AND ROLE IN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
A. Overview of Arbitration as a Method of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution 
Arbitration fills an important and unique niche in the field of 
alternative dispute resolution and has been touted as a method 
through which businesses as well as individuals can resolve 
disputes cheaply, quickly, and privately.15 Arbitration allows for 
the resolution of claims by a mutually agreed upon third party16 
who investigates the claim(s) and makes a determination based on 
the evidence.17 This process saves disputants the investments of 
time and money that are inevitable in traditional judicial 
proceedings.18 Further, arbitration often facilitates a more 
satisfactory resolution because the parties may select an arbitrator 
who is an expert in the relevant area of law and they have the 
authority to limit the scope of the arbitrator’s review.19 
B.  Arbitration: The Pros and The Cons 
Alternative Dispute Resolution includes a variety of conflict 
resolution methods that can be used as an alternative to traditional 
judicial proceedings.20 Private Arbitration is the most popular type 
                                                           
15 See William H. Daughtry, Jr. & Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Shifting Attorney’s 
Fees in Litigation Attacking Commercial Arbitration Awards: A Disincentive 
for Meritless Motions for Correction, Modification or Vacatur, 35 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 515 (1998). 
16 The “third party” chosen as arbitrator is not required by law to have any 
specific qualifications such as a law degree or experience as an attorney or judge. 
It is only when the arbitration agreement or the statute providing for arbitration 
specifies requirements for an acceptable arbitrator that the arbitrator is required to 
have these specific qualifications. See 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute 
Resolution § 154 (2006). 
17 See id. § 8. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. § 9. 
20 Id. § 1. 
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of alternative dispute resolution because of its unique 
characteristics.21 It offers parties the ability to resolve their dispute 
outside of the public eye, within agreed upon parameters, and often 
without the need for judicial intervention.22 
Despite the many benefits of private arbitration, there are also 
some drawbacks.23 These drawbacks manifest themselves in the 
arbitrator’s decision making power and the subsequent rights of the 
parties involved in the arbitration to further adjudicate their claims. 
While parties can choose an arbitrator who is experienced in the 
subject matter of the dispute, arbitrators, unlike judges, are not 
required to have been instructed in the judicial application of the 
law.24 Consequently, the arbitrator may misapply the law to the 
detriment of one or both parties. Further, without a clause in the 
arbitration agreement specifying otherwise, an arbitrator is not 
required to document the reasoning behind his decision.25 An 
empty record can spell trouble for a dissatisfied party that has to 
demonstrate on appeal both that the arbitrator misapplied the law 
to the claim and that the arbitrator intentionally disregarded the 
law. 
C.  Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Is Limited 
Judicial review of arbitration awards is relatively limited.26 By 
agreeing to arbitrate, parties forfeit their right to a jury trial and 
agree to the stipulations set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“the FAA”).27 These stipulations state that an arbitration award 
                                                           
21 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 9 (2006). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. § 11. 
24 Id. § 11. 
25 Id. 
26 Id.; see also Poser, supra note 9, at 503; Christopher R. Drahozal, Civil 
Law, Procedure, and Private International Law: New Experiences of 
International Arbitration in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 233 (2006) 
(quoting Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 89, 90 n.3 
(1995) (In fact, the Federal Arbitration Act has been characterized as “barebones” 
because of the limited occasions in which it allows courts to review and vacate 
arbitration awards). 
27 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 11 (2006). 
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can be vacated by courts only in the following limited 
circumstances: 1) the award was obtained by corruption, fraud, or 
undue means; 2) there was evidence of partiality or corruption on 
the part of the arbitrators; 3) the arbitrator is guilty of misconduct 
or misbehavior that prejudiced the rights of either party; or 4) the 
arbitrator acted outside the confines of the powers authorized to 
him or failed to execute his powers such that a resolution was never 
reached.28 
In addition to these four circumstances in which a court is 
authorized to vacate an award, the FAA allows a court to modify 
an award under the following circumstances: 1) there has been 
either a material miscalculation of figures or a material mistake in 
the description of an object referred to in the award; 2) there is 
evidence showing the arbitrators made an award in connection with 
a matter that had not been submitted for their review; or 3) an 
arbitration award is imperfect in the form in which it was made.29 
While the provisions set out in the FAA protect a majority of 
the rights of parties who submit to arbitration, there are a number 
of circumstances affecting these rights that it does not protect 
against.30 The most recognized circumstances that lead to judicial 
review of arbitration awards under the common law rather than the 
FAA are when an arbitrator 1) manifestly disregards the law he is 
being asked to apply, 2) fails to draw his or her award from the 
essence of the contract, 3) creates an award that is “completely 
irrational,” or 4) where the award is bad public policy.31 These 
common law exceptions to the finality of arbitration awards 
provide leeway to parties that agree to submit to arbitration but 
want to ensure they obtain a just award in addition to a speedy and 
economical resolution. 
The common law avenues for judicial review are unique in that 
they illustrate the balance courts are trying to strike between just 
resolutions and resolutions that are quick and inexpensive. All of 
the common law rules permitting judicial review recognize the risk 
                                                           
28 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 (a)(1)d–(4) (2007). 
29 9 U.S.C. §§ 11 (a)–(c) (2007). 
30 Kenneth Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in the 
Securities Industry, 78 B.U.L. REV. 255, 305–06 (1998). 
31 Id. at 306. 
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associated with choosing arbitration as a method of dispute 
resolution. These rules, unlike the FAA rules outlined above, 
enable parties to accept the inherent risk of arbitration along with 
the assurance that there is a judicial safety net that will catch them 
if their award does not conform to legal norms. The manifest 
disregard doctrine exemplifies this balance. Under the manifest 
disregard doctrine, parties are able to appeal awards that are 
contrary to applicable law.32 This provides protection not afforded 
in the FAA and ensures that the goal of a just resolution is not 
overcome by the objectives of increased efficiency and reduced 
expense.33 
D.  The Role of Arbitration Today 
Domestic use of arbitration has grown steadily over the past 
decade.34 In light of that growth, the lack of judicial oversight 
regarding the arbitration process, specifically with respect to the 
structure of the appeal process, has created some concern.35 While 
this lack of oversight raises legitimate concern, it is an inherent 
characteristic of arbitration and it can be assumed that parties 
accept this when they agree to settle disputes through the 
arbitration process.36 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
eloquently stated this risk in its decision in Kyocera Corp v. 
Prudential-Bache T Servs:37 
The risk that arbitrators may construe the governing law 
imperfectly in the course of delivering a decision that 
attempts in good faith to interpret the relevant law, or may 
make errors with respect to the evidence on which they 
base their rulings, is a risk that every party to arbitration 
                                                           
32 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953). 
33 Poser, supra note 9, at 503. 
34 Stephen K. Huber, The Arbitration Jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit: 
Round III, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 535, 580 (2006). 
35 Caroline E. Mayer, There’s no Way to Arbitrate This Issue; Critics, 
Firms at Odds on Policy, WASH. POST, Jul. 14, 2002, at H01. 
36 Hedges, supra note 2, at 1647. 
37 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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assumes. . . .38 
In addition to domestic growth, the United States’ participation in 
international arbitration has greatly increased since the early 
1990s.39 In 2002, following a decade in which the American 
Arbitration Association’s participation in international arbitration 
tripled, the organization declared itself “the largest international 
commercial arbitral institution in the world.”40 
The United States is involved in international arbitration at a 
variety of levels. For instance, the United States has agreed to 
submit to international arbitration for disputes arising out of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Central 
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Further, Congress has 
codified the United States’ commitment to international arbitration 
in section 207 of the FAA which includes the New York 
Convention—an international agreement fostered by the United 
Nations establishing the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitration awards.41 Section 207 of the FAA states that courts 
under the jurisdiction of the United States will confirm 
international arbitration awards unless the awards fall into one of 
the ten categories which create exceptions to this rule.42 
In addition to its involvement with international arbitration, the 
United States (“U.S.”) takes part in international dispute resolution 
on a smaller scale through numerous bilateral investment treaties.43 
Indirectly, the U.S. is also increasingly involved in international 
arbitration as U.S. citizens are being chosen as arbitrators for 
international disputes, and the United States is frequently chosen 
as a forum for the arbitration of international disputes.44 
Finally, although the FAA recognizes the manifest disregard 
doctrine as a method for challenging an arbitration award, the New 
York Convention is silent as to how courts in the forum nation 
                                                           
38 Id. at 1003. 
39 Drahozal, supra note 26, at 233. 
40 Id. (quoting from www.adr.org). 
41 See id. at 241. 
42 9 U.S.C. 207 (2007). 
43 Drahozal, supra note 26, at 235. 
44 Id. at 244–45. 
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should review the award.45 The New York Convention focuses on 
the enforcement of arbitration awards in nations other than the 
country where the award was decided, and therefore, does not 
explicitly recognize the manifest reward doctrine.46 Consequently 
U.S. Federal Courts are able to apply the doctrine of manifest 
disregard to arbitration awards involving international parties 
despite the fact that the New York Convention does not recognize 
the standard. It is not a violation of the New York Convention for 
U.S. Federal Courts to vacate an arbitration award based on the 
common law of the United States so long as the award was decided 
in the Untied States or a U.S. territory.47 Given this unique 
application of manifest disregard, it behooves parties to 
international arbitration agreements to think carefully before 
choosing the forum for their arbitration proceedings. Specifically, 
these parties should consider whether they agree with the principle 
of manifest disregard and whether they want to expose themselves 
to the possibility of having their arbitration award vacated on this 
ground. 
II.  MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW 
A.  History of the Manifest Disregard Standard 
Manifest disregardone of the limited circumstances in which 
arbitration awards can be reviewed and the most widely used 
common law method of vacating arbitration awards48was first 
introduced in dicta within the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilko v. 
Swan.49 “The interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in 
contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, 
to judicial review for error in interpretation.”50 The Court’s 1953 
                                                           
45 Id. at 241. 
46 Richard W. Hulbert, Comment on a Proposed New Statute for 
International Arbitration, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 153, 157 (2002). 
47 Id. 
48 See Gaitis, supra note 13, at 47. 
49 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
50 Id. at 436–37. 
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statement has been accepted by all circuits as providing a non-
statutory avenue for judicial review of arbitration awards if the 
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the relevant law.51 
When evaluating an appeal based on manifest disregard, the 
court typically looks for two specific elements of the arbitrator’s 
act: that the arbitrator knew of the relevant legal rule and ignored it, 
and that the legal rule ignored by the arbitrator was unambiguous in 
its meaning and applicability to the case.52 As the two cases that 
are the focus of this Note will illustrate, the variances in the 
standards used by courts when evaluating an appeal based on 
manifest disregard are the result of differences in the ways in which 
the courts interpret and apply those two elements to the facts of a 
case.53 Specifically, the differing outcomes in the two cases 
considered below are a result of which factor the courts found to be 
determinative. This Note will focus on manifest disregard because 
it is the standard that, given the lack of guidance from the Supreme 
Court and the circuits’ various applications of the doctrine, 
appears to provide the most challenge to courts. Some have gone so 
far to say that the doctrine of manifest disregard has “taken on a 
life of its own” as a result of this lack of guidance and uniformity.54 
 
B.  Two Diverging Cases55 
It has been suggested that there is the emergence of a split 
between the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits over the application of 
                                                           
51 Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 12. 
52 Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 12. 
53 Compare Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, 441 F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir. 
2006), a contradiction of the plain and unambiguous terms of the contract is not 
reasonable and is evidence of manifest disregard, with B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC 
v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 911–12 (11th Cir. 2006), an “argument 
that the arbitration award clearly contradicts an express term of the contract is 
simply another way of saying that the arbitrator clearly erred,” is insufficient to 
establish manifest disregard. 
54 William Park et al., International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 37 
INT’L LAW. 445 n.3 (2003). 
55 Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 12. 
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the manifest disregard standard.56 While the courts reached 
different outcomes in two recent cases, these cases nonetheless 
illustrate the variance of the manifest disregard standard between 
jurisdictions. The result of these variations, coupled with the 
inevitable application of subjective judicial interpretation, has led 
to the recent inconsistent verdicts. 
However, this is not to say that the circuits necessarily reach 
opposing conclusions when applying the manifest disregard 
standard. This Note argues that while the Fourth Circuit would 
have agreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in B.L. Harbert 
Int’l, L.L.C. v. Hercules Steel Co.,57 the Eleventh Circuit would not 
have reached the same conclusion as the Fourth Circuit in Patten v. 
Signator Insurance Agency, Inc.58 This difference can be attributed 
to the nuances of the two circuits’ manifest disregard standards; 
specifically, which of the two facets of manifest disregard each 
court gives the most weight to when analyzing an appeal.59 In 
Patten, the Fourth Circuit focused on whether the legal rule ignored 
by the arbitrator was unambiguous in its meaning and applicability 
to the case.60 In Harbert, however, the Eleventh Circuit focused on 
whether there was evidence that the arbitrator knew of the relevant 
legal rule and ignored it; the court gave less weight to whether the 
legal rule was unambiguous in its meaning and applicability.61 
                                                           
56 Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 12. 
57 441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2006). 
58 441 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2006). 
59 Compare Harbert, 441 F.3d at 910 with Patten, 441 F.3d at 235. In 
Patten, the Fourth Circuit looks most closely at whether the legal rule was 
ambiguous, while in Harbert the Eleventh Circuit looks not at whether the legal 
rule was ambiguous but instead, at whether there is evidence that the arbitrator 
knew the law and ignored it. If the legal rule is unambiguous and the arbitrator 
applies a contrary legal rule, the Fourth Circuit will find manifest disregard 
regardless of whether there is evidence that the arbitrator knew the law and 
intentionally ignored it, while the Eleventh Circuit will only find manifest 
disregard if there is evidence the arbitrator knew the law and intentionally 
disregarded it. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 910; Patten, 441 F.3d at 235. 
60  441 F.3d at 235. 
61  441 F.3d at 910. 
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1.  Patten v. Signator Insurance Agency 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
recently reviewed an arbitration decision that had been appealed on 
the grounds of manifest disregard of the law.62 The case, Patten v. 
Signator Insurance Agency, concerned alleged employment 
discrimination and was originally brought in the form of arbitration 
by the employee, Ralph Patten.63 Patten was dismissed from his 
position with Signator Insurance Agency (“Signator”) on December 
13, 2000, effective January 2, 2001, allegedly for violating 
company policy by advancing premiums for clients.64 In August of 
2001, eight months after his dismissal, Patten sent a letter to 
Signator informing the company that he intended to bring a claim 
based on age discrimination.65 Settlement negotiations then took 
place between the two parties; however, these negations were 
unsuccessful, and in March of 2002, fourteen months after his 
dismissal, Patten sent a formal demand for arbitration.66 Signator 
responded with a letter stating that the company would not 
participate in arbitration because Patten’s claim was time-barred 
under the parties’ arbitration agreement.67 
The relevant documents to the arbitration claim are two 
employment contracts between Patten and Signator.68 In the first 
contract, drawn up in 1992 after Patten had been promoted to the 
position of General Agent for the insurance company, the parties 
agreed to arbitrate all disputes and to give notice of such arbitration 
within one year of the incident in question.69 In 1998, Patten and 
Signator engaged in a second contract whereby they again agreed to 
arbitrate all claims; however, this contract included different terms 
regulating the arbitration process.70 In contrast to the 1992 
                                                           
62 Patten, 441 F.3d 230. 
63 Id. at 232. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 232 (4th Cir. 2006). 
69 Id. at 231. 
70 Id. at 231–32. 
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contract, the 1998 contract was silent as to any date by which 
arbitration had to be brought.71 In addition, the second contract 
appeared to preempt the first contract due to a clause which stated 
that the 1998 contract “supersedes all previous agreements, oral or 
written, between the parties hereto regarding the subject matter 
hereof.”72 
Following the trial, the court granted summary judgment, 
mandating Signator to participate in arbitration; the parties finally 
began arbitrating the wrongful termination, breach of contract, 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 
unlawful discrimination claims asserted by Patten.73 When the 
arbitrator reviewed these claims brought by Patten, however, he 
decided that they were time-barred and therefore decided in favor 
of Signator.74 
The arbitrator did not decide the case on its merits.75 Instead, 
he looked at the dates corresponding to when Patten had been 
terminated by Signator, January 2, 2001, and when the notice of 
arbitration had been asserted by Patten, March 4, 2002.76 The 
arbitrator noted that Patten gave Signator notice of a demand to 
arbitrate as a means to resolve his “claims of discrimination, 
wrongful termination, and breach of contract”77 over a year after he 
had been terminated by the insurance company.78 Patten responded 
with two arguments to support his claims.79 First, he provided 
evidence that his first letter notifying Signator of his claims was 
sent eight months after his termination, within the one-year time-
frame of the first contract, and second, he noted that his 
subsequent letter to Signator, in which he gave notice of his intent 
to compel arbitration, was acceptable because there was no time-
                                                           
71 Id. at 232. 
72 Id. (citing page 12 of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in the 
appeal). 
73 Id. at 232. 
74 Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 233 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 75  Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 232. 
78 Id. at 233. 
79 Id. 
KENNEDY FINAL DRAFT AUTHORIZED.DOC 12/3/07 10:20 PM  
430 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
frame stipulated in the second contract.80 Despite this argument, 
the arbitrator found that Patten had not complied with the 
arbitration agreements.81 The arbitrator decided that the one-year 
limit in which to bring a claim stated in the first contract was 
implicitly carried over to the second contract, and therefore, the 
notice of intent to compel arbitration was ineffective because it 
occurred over a year after Patten’s termination.82 The arbitrator 
granted Signator’s motion for summary judgment.83 
Displeased with this outcome, Patten appealed the arbitrator’s 
decision to the district court on grounds that the arbitrator had 
manifestly disregarded the law; specifically, that he had failed to 
draw the award from the contractual agreement between Patten and 
Signator.84 Patten asserted that these violations occurred when the 
arbitrator disregarded the superseding clause of the second 
agreement and instead carried the one-year time limit stated in the 
first contract over to the second contract.85 The district court 
disagreed with Patten.86 The court stated that the arbitrator had not 
ignored applicable laws and that a misinterpretation of the 
arbitration agreements was insufficient to vacate the arbitration 
award.87 Patten appealed to the appellate division.88 
The issue addressed by the appellate court was whether the 
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law as to the time frame 
within which Patten had to bring his suit.89 While the district court 
noted that the arbitrator may have made an error in his 
interpretation of the contract, it decided that such an error did not 
constitute manifest disregard and therefore was insufficient to 
trigger judicial review.90 In contrast, the appellate court found that 
                                                           
80 Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 233 (4th Cir. 2006). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2006). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 235. 
90 Id. at 233. 
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the arbitrator had “disregarded the plain and unambiguous language 
of the governing arbitration agreement. . . .” and had “failed to draw 
his award from the essence of the agreement.”91 As a result, the 
appellate court found that the arbitrator’s decision was in manifest 
disregard of the law.92 
In arriving at this decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
applied a standard of manifest disregard whereby a violation occurs 
when an arbitrator “understands and correctly states the law, but 
proceeds to disregard the same”93 or “disregards or modifies 
unambiguous contract provisions.”94 The court elaborated on what 
it would mean to disregard or modify an unambiguous contract 
provision by stating that a violation of failing to draw an award 
from the essence of the agreement is established when either the 
arbitrator makes his decision based upon “personal notions of right 
and wrong”95 or the award fails to be “rationally inferable from the 
contract.”96 Thus, the Fourth Circuit analyzed whether the legal 
rule ignored by the arbitrator was unambiguous in its meaning and 
applicability to the case rather than whether it was clear that the 
arbitrator knew of the relevant legal rule and ignored it. 
In Patten, the arbitrator’s application of a one-year limitation 
was deemed “not reasonable” because it contradicted the clearly 
stated terms of the 1998 contract which specified that it 
superseded all previous agreements.97 The court found that the 
arbitrator imposed his own opinions as to what the contract should 
have said rather than applying the terms stated in the contract and 
consequently, overrode the parties’ specific intent.98 Applying its 
standard for manifest disregard, the Fourth Circuit held that 
                                                           
91 Id. at 235. 
92 Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir. 2006). 
93 Id. quoting Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 31, 933 
F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1991)). 
94 Patten, 441 F.3d at 235 (citing Mo. River Servs. v. Omaha Tribe, 267 
F.3d 848, 854 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
95 Patten, 441 F.3d at 235 (quoting Upshur Coals, 993 F.2d at 229). 
96 Patten, 441 F.3d at 235 (citing Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S. 
Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188, 193 n.5 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
97 441 F.3d at 236. 
98 Id. 
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because the contract was unambiguous, the arbitrator did not 
merely misapply contract law or err in his interpretation of the 
contract, but altered the agreement without authority.99 
Consequently, his acts constituted a manifest disregard of the 
law.100 
It is interesting to note that in its decision, the appellate court 
invoked a standard of reasonableness when referring to the 
arbitrator’s actions: “the one-year limitations period imposed by 
the arbitrator was not reasonable, in that it contradicted the plain 
and unambiguous terms of the Management Agreement.”101 This 
Note will return to the Fourth Circuit’s emphasis on 
reasonableness when comparing the different standards used by 
courts.102 For now, it will suffice to say the Eleventh Circuit has 
not stated whether it will take into account whether an arbitrator’s 
decision is unreasonable when evaluating an appeal based on the 
doctrine of manifest disregard of the law;103 though given the 
court’s decision in Harbert, reasonableness does not appear to be a 
relevant factor in the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis. 
2.  B.L. Harbert International, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co. 
In B.L. Harbert International, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., the 
Eleventh Circuit refused to vacate an arbitration award that had 
been appealed on the grounds of manifest disregard because there 
was no evidence in the record that the arbitrator knew the 
appropriate law and intentionally failed to apply the law.104 In the 
eyes of the Eleventh Circuit, the possibility of error on the part of 
the arbitrator did not give rise to a level of misconduct that would 
trigger manifest disregard.105 Rather, to invoke manifest disregard, 
the court imposed the requirement that the error made by the 
                                                           
99 Id. at 235. 
100 Id. at 236. 
101 Id. (emphasis added). 
102 See supra text accompanying notes 153–57. 
103 See B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 911–
12 (11th Cir. 2006). 
104 Id. at 911–13. 
105 Id. at 911. 
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arbitrator must have been deliberate.106 
Harbert is the result of a commercial contract dispute between 
a construction firm, B.L. Harbert International (“Harbert”), and a 
steel manufacturer, Hercules Steel Company (“Hercules”).107 In the 
subcontract between the two parties, there were two schedules 
specified: a “progress schedule” and a “product schedule.”108 The 
completion dates specified in these schedules differed by more than 
six months.109 The conflict between the parties arose when Harbert 
became displeased with what it considered to be tardiness on the 
part of Hercules.110 Harbert reacted to the delay in production by 
refusing to continue its payments to Hercules and by claiming that 
it was owed money in excess of the balance due to Hercules on the 
subcontract.111 In response, Hercules initiated arbitration 
proceedings.112 Hercules’ objective was to receive the balance it 
was owed and to receive an additional award to recover other 
expenses related to the disagreement, such as attorney’s fees.113 
Harbert counterclaimed for delay damages and an additional claim 
to recover for other costs and fees associated with the delay and 
the arbitration proceedings.114 
As a result of the arbitration, Hercules was awarded the 
remainder of the balance on the contract owed by Harbert.115 
However, it appeared to Hercules that the arbitrator had erred in 
his award because he had awarded Hercules one-hundred thousand 
dollars less than both parties had agreed was the contract 
balance.116 Thus, Hercules requested a clarification on the award.117 
                                                           
106 Id. at 912. 
107 Id. at 907. 
108 Id.  
109 See B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 907–
08 (11th Cir. 2006). 
110 Id. at 908. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 908 (11th 
Cir. 2006). 
116 Id. 
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Harbert also asked for a clarification of the arbitrator’s analysis of 
the six ‘issues for decision’—topics identified by both parties to 
help explain the basis for the arbitrator’s award.118 In response, the 
arbitrator increased the award by one-hundred thousand dollars and 
provided an explanation of his reasoning as to the identified 
topics.119 He explained that his award favored Hercules because he 
had determined that they were bound by the longer project 
schedule which was used to guide the builders, rather than the 
product schedule which had been “unilaterally set by Harbert.”120 
Unhappy with the arbitration result, Harbert appealed to the 
district court citing manifest disregard for the law as the grounds 
for appeal.121 Predictably, Hercules responded by asking the 
district court to confirm the award.122 The district court examined 
the briefs the parties had submitted to the arbitrator and found that 
despite evidence that Hercules had been sent a copy of the shorter 
schedule before signing the contract, and thus presumably would 
have been bound to that shorter schedule under fundamental 
principles on contract law, there was nothing to establish that the 
arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the law when making his 
award.123 Specifically, the court determined that the arbitrator had 
likely found that Hercules was bound by the contract providing a 
longer time-table for delivery, and because this was an 
interpretation of the arbitrator, it was beyond the boundary of 
judicial review for a manifest disregard claim.124 
                                                           
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 909. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. Harbert had created two schedules governing the time-table of the 
development project. Hercules work fell within the timetable of one contract but 
failed to meet the deadlines of the other contract. In explaining his award, the 
arbitrator stated that rather than being bound by the contract with the shorter 
time-table “unilaterally set by Harbert,” Hercules should be bound by the 
contract with the more lenient time-table. Id. 
121 B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 909 (11th 
Cir. 2006). 
122 Id. at 908. 
123 Id. at 909. 
124 Id. 
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Harbert appealed the court’s decision to no avail.125 Though the 
evidence indicated that Hercules was aware of the shorter schedule 
prior to signing the contract, this was not sufficient to satisfy the 
Eleventh Circuit’s standard for reversal based on manifest 
disregard.126 The court found that the arbitrator may have erred by 
not following an express term contained in the contract but not 
through an intentional disregard of the law.127 The appellate court 
characterized the appeal as little more than the griping of a 
customer “unhappy” with the arbitration process.128 Quoting the 
court in Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc.,129 the Harbert 
court stated that it needed to see “evidence that the arbitrator was 
‘conscious of the law and deliberately ignore[d] it.’”130 To 
emphasize that mere error in the arbitrator’s decision would be 
insufficient to establish manifest disregard of the law, the court 
elaborated, “Harbert’s argument that the arbitration award clearly 
contradicts an express term of the contract is simply another way 
of saying that the arbitrator clearly erred, and even a showing of a 
clear error on the part of the arbitrator is not enough.”131 
In its decision, the appellate court laid out some important 
guidelines for invoking manifest disregard claims.132 As noted 
above, the court indicated that error is not enough to invoke 
manifest disregard133 and “misinterpretation of a contract”134 is also 
an insufficient basis for appealing on the grounds of manifest 
disregard.135 Additionally, the court found that manifest disregard 
is only appropriate in cases where there is evidence that the 
                                                           
125 Id. at 912–13. 
126 Id. at 911–12. 
127 B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 911–12 
(11th Cir. 2006). 
128 Id. at 909. 
129 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997). 
130 Harbert, 441 F.3d at 910 (quoting Montes, 128 F.3d at 1461). 
131 Harbert, 441 F.3d at 911–12. 
132 Id. at 913. 
133 Id. at 911. 
134 Id. at 913. 
135 Id. 
KENNEDY FINAL DRAFT AUTHORIZED.DOC 12/3/07 10:20 PM  
436 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
arbitrator knew the law and intentionally did not apply the law.136 
It is clear that the Harbert Court relied heavily upon whether the 
arbitrator knew of the relevant legal rule and ignored it, and the 
court paid far less attention to whether the legal rule ignored by the 
arbitrator was unambiguous in its meaning and applicability to the 
case. To illustrate the strictness with which judges should apply 
this standard, the court noted that the Eleventh Circuit has only 
found one instance of manifest disregard of the law.137 
In its decision the appellate court explained that policy 
considerations support the strict criteria for successful manifest 
disregard claims.138 The generally acknowledged purpose of 
arbitration is to resolve disputes as quickly and inexpensively as 
possible.139 To ensure that arbitration continues to serve this 
purpose, there needs to be a method of preventing parties from 
frivolously dragging cases through the courts because arbitration 
appeals add cost and delay to the dispute resolution process.140 
In accordance with this goal of arbitration, the court used its 
decision to discourage the practice of appealing arbitration awards 
and to support the utilization of arbitration by parties.141 
Specifically, the court warned Harbert and potential litigants that 
appeals based on the manifest disregard doctrine may result in 
sanctions if the appellant fails to allege the arbitrator knowingly 
ignored the applicable law.142 The court did not apply sanctions to 
Harbert because it felt sanctions would be unjust as Harbert was 
not on notice that his appeal could result in such punishment.143 
However, the court made it clear that sanctions are a real and 
                                                           
136 Id. at 912–13. 
137 B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 911 (11th 
Cir. 2006). The only case in which the Eleventh Circuit has found manifest 
disregard of the law is Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456 
(11th Cir. 1997). 
138 Harbert, 441 F.3d at 907. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 913. 
141 Id. at 913–14. 
142 Id. at 913–14. 
143 B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 914 (11th 
Cir. 2006). 
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present threat to future parties that drag baseless arbitration claims 
into Eleventh Circuit courts on the grounds of manifest 
disregard.144 
C.  Comparing Patten and Harbert with Montes 
In order to conduct a meaningful analysis of the Fourth and 
Eleventh Circuits’ decisions, it is important to identify two 
differences between the decisions and to eliminate these factors as 
deciding influences in the courts’ rulings. Notably, the Fourth 
Circuit decision in Patten pertained to an employment dispute, and 
the Eleventh Circuit decision in Harbert concerned a contractual 
dispute. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit’s case involved an 
individual and a large corporation while the Eleventh Circuit’s case 
involved two corporations. To ensure that these cases can be 
compared against one another, this Note focuses upon an additional 
Eleventh Circuit case mentioned previously, Montes v. Shearson 
Lehman Bros.,145 and compares the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
Montesan employment dispute between an individual and a 
corporationto its decision in Harbert. Though Montes and 
Harbert produced different judgments, a comparison between the 
analyses in the two decisions illustrates that the Eleventh Circuit 
has applied a uniform standard of what is required to establish 
manifest disregard of the law. 
In Montes, the Eleventh Circuit used the manifest disregard 
doctrine to vacate an arbitrator’s award in favor of an employee 
who alleged she was not paid her overtime wages.146 At arbitration, 
the employee’s attorney instructed the arbitrator as to the 
applicable law but then asked him not to apply the law.147 As a 
result of the evidence that the arbitrator knew of the law but 
intentionally failed to follow the law,148 the Eleventh Circuit held 
                                                           
144 Id. 
145 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 1459. 
148 Id. (reporting that the attorney said to the arbitrator: “You have to 
decide whether you’re going to follow the statutes that have been presented to 
you, or whether you will do or want to do or should do what is right and just 
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the manifest disregard doctrine was satisfied and found in favor of 
the employer.149 
If one looks at the details of Montes, it is clear that the subject 
matter of the dispute in Harbert did not impact the standard of 
manifest disregard applied by the court. It is evident that the less 
sympathetic subject matter of the dispute in Harbert did not sway 
the court’s application of manifest disregard because the Eleventh 
Circuit found evidence of manifest disregard of the law in an 
arbitration decision in Montes;150 Montes, like Patten, was also an 
employment dispute. The court used the same method of analyzing 
a manifest disregard claim in Montes as it did in Harbert; thus, the 
subject matter of the case can be safely put aside as a non-factor. 
To determine whether the status of the parties as individuals or 
corporations affected the judicial analysis in Patten and Harbert, it 
is important to consider whether the Eleventh Circuit would 
employ such a rigid standard of manifest disregard in a case that 
involved an individual litigating against a corporation. Returning to 
Montes—the seminal case for manifest disregard in the Eleventh 
Circuit—one is able to see that the same strict standard applied to 
the corporation in Harbert was also applied to the individual.151 As 
described above, the Montes court reversed an arbitrator’s decision 
that had been in favor of the individual in an effort to correct the 
arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.152 Following the Harbert 
Court’s close adherence to the principles laid out in Montes, it can 
be inferred that the court would not have been affected had one of 
the parties been an individual asserting a claim against a 
corporation, as occurred in Patten. 
                                                           
and equitable in this case.”). 
149 Id. at 1461–62. 
150 See Montes, 128 F.3d at 1463–64. 
151 Compare id. at 1461–62, with B.L. Harbert Int’l v. Hercules Steel Co., 
441 F.3d 905, 911 (11th Cir. 2006) (The Montes court explicitly based its 
ruling on the fact that there was evidence that the arbitrator knew the applicable 
law and intentionally disregarded; this is the same standard applied in Harbert). 
152 Montes, 128 F.3d at 1464. 
KENNEDY FINAL DRAFT AUTHORIZED.DOC 12/3/07 10:20 PM  
 MANIFEST DISREGARD IN ARBITRATION AWARDS 439 
D.  Do These Cases Indicate a Split in the Courts or Merely a 
Tension? 
The variation between the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, as 
illustrated by Patten and Harbert, can be attributed to the courts’ 
divergent views of which factor in the manifest disregard standard 
should be emphasized. The Fourth Circuit looked primarily at 
whether the legal rule ignored by the arbitrator was unambiguous in 
its meaning and applicability to the case153 while the Eleventh 
Circuit looked primarily at whether there was evidence that the 
arbitrator intentionally disregarded the law.154 Given the two 
elements of a manifest disregard claim—that the arbitrator knew of 
the relevant legal rule and ignored it and that the legal rule ignored 
by the arbitrator was unambiguous in its meaning and applicability 
to the case—it is evident that the discrepancy between the Fourth 
and Eleventh Circuits lies in which factor receives the most weight 
in the courts’ analyses. While the outcomes are not entirely in 
conflict with one another, the two courts’ analyses demonstrate a 
lack of uniformity that has the potential to cause undesirable side-
effects. 
If the Eleventh Circuit’s manifest disregard analysis is applied 
to the facts of Patten, it becomes apparent that the Court would 
have not found evidence of manifest disregard of the law. Harbert 
demonstrates that judicial review in the Eleventh Circuit requires 
evidence that the arbitrator knew of the applicable law and 
intentionally disregarded it.155 Had Patten come before a court in 
the Eleventh Circuit, it is very likely that the court would not have 
invoked the doctrine of manifest disregard because the evidence 
presented in that case failed to establish that the arbitrator 
intentionally disregarded relevant law.156 
The Eleventh Circuit would have approached Patten from a 
different angle than that of the Fourth Circuit. The court in Harbert 
                                                           
153 Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir. 
2006). 
154 Harbert, 441 F.3d at 912. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 912–13. 
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stated, “[t]he contract is not part of the applicable law, but the 
agreement of the parties to which the law is applied. In any event, 
as we have already explained, errors of law are not enough to 
justify setting aside an arbitration award.”157 Therefore the issue 
examined by the court would not have been the content of the two 
contracts between Ralph Patten and Signator Insurance, but rather, 
the arbitrator’s application of the law onto those contracts. The 
Eleventh Circuit would not have looked at whether the arbitrator 
erred in applying a term from a previous contract to a later 
contract, as the Fourth Circuit did, but would instead have looked 
at whether there was evidence that the arbitrator knew the law and 
intentionally applied the incorrect contract term. 
Even if the Eleventh Circuit determined that the arbitrator in 
Patten incorrectly carried over the one-year statute of limitations 
from the first contract into the second contract, the Court would 
not have vacated the arbitrator’s award on grounds of manifest 
disregard of the law. Rather, the Court would have viewed the 
arbitrator’s error as a misinterpretation of contract terms, or at 
most, a legal error—something the Eleventh Circuit distinctly 
identified as insufficient to invoke the doctrine of manifest 
disregard.158 There is no indication in the facts of Patten to suggest 
that the arbitrator knew the correct rules of contract law to apply 
and intentionally failed to apply the relevant law. Consequently, it 
can be assumed that the Eleventh Circuit would not have found the 
arbitrator’s award in Patten to have been in manifest disregard of 
the law. 159 
It is less clear how Harbert would have come out if it had been 
heard in the Fourth Circuit. Like Patten, Harbert involved two 
different documents that conveyed conflicting information 
pertaining to the same situation.160 However, unlike Patten, neither 
                                                           
157 Id. at 913. 
158 Id. at 913. 
159 See id. at 912–913. 
160 Compare Patten, 441 F.3d 235, with Harbert, 441 F.3d 905. In 
Harbert, the documents were two conflicting schedules, a product schedule and 
progress schedule; the dispute between the parties emerged because they could 
not agree on which schedule was controlling. Harbert, 441 F.3d 905. In Patten, 
the dispute arose out of whether the original employment contract was 
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document in Harbert contained a clause stating that one contract 
superseded the other. It was this type of clause in Patten that made 
the arbitrator’s interpretation conflict with “the plain and 
unambiguous terms of the Management Agreement.”161 The 
important facet of Patten is that it appears that the Fourth Circuit 
analyzed the arbitrator’s analysis with regard to the ambiguousness 
of the contract terms rather than the arbitrator’s intentional 
application, or non-application, of law to the contract (as the 
Eleventh Circuit would have done). It is doubtful that Harbert 
would have met the Fourth Circuit’s standard for manifest 
disregard. Due to the existence of two conflicting schedules, the 
arbitrator was faced with ambiguity as to how to apply the law. 
Consequently, regardless of how the arbitrator had interpreted this 
case, it is unlikely that the Fourth Circuit would have found him to 
have acted with manifest disregard because his decision would not 
have been in conflict with unambiguous terms of the contract. 
Having analyzed the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits’ applications 
of manifest disregard, Patten would not have been found to be an 
instance of manifest disregard by the Eleventh Circuit, while 
Harbert would have met the same outcome had it been heard in the 
Fourth Circuit. While these hypothetical outcomes indicate a lack 
of consensus on which factor is most persuasive in a manifest 
disregard appeal, they do not provide evidence of a circuit split. 
Nonetheless, serious consequences to the role of arbitration in 
dispute resolution will arise if a uniform standard of manifest 
disregard is not implemented throughout the circuits. 
III.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THESE INCONSISTENT STANDARDS 
A.  Domestic Waves of Confusion 
With the confusion as to how courts apply the manifest 
disregard standard, and the newly added threat of sanctions for 
meritless appeals, attorneys are in a precarious position when 
                                                           
controlling or whether it was superseded by the second employment contract. 
Patten, 441 F.3d 235.  
161 Patten, 441 F.3d at 236. 
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advising their clients whether to pursue judicial review of 
arbitration awards.162 Some members of the academic community 
have suggested that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision will give 
prospective arbitration candidates more confidence in the 
arbitration system and in arbitration awards.163 The logic of this 
argument is that if courts give arbitrators more deference, and 
therefore more control, arbitrators will feel obligated to 
demonstrate a greater degree of professionalism and there will be 
fewer instances of manifest disregard of the law.164 Also, 
presumably parties will be able to rely on the finality of arbitration 
decisions with greater confidence. 
However, this analysis, which focused solely on the Harbert 
decision, ignores the inconsistent application of the manifest 
disregard standard. Consequently, while parties to arbitration in the 
Eleventh Circuit may have more confidence in the finality of 
arbitration awards, it does not necessarily follow that all arbitration 
parties will feel confident because not all courts use sanctions 
based on the strict standard laid out by the Eleventh Circuit to 
restrict unwarranted appeals. An arbitrator’s unreasonable 
conclusion constitutes grounds for a successful appeal based on 
manifest disregard in one circuit and grounds for sanctions if 
appealed in another circuit.165 Thus, any potential validity to this 
hypothesis cannot be radiated throughout the circuits. Unless the 
parties are certain as to which jurisdiction they will select for 
arbitration, parties will be unable to predict whether courts will 
                                                           
162 See Geri Dreiling, No Pity for Poor Losers, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, 
March 17, 2006.  
163 See id. (arguing that parties will be more confident in arbitration because 
the courts are putting more pressure on the arbitrators to be “professional and do 
good work”). 
164 See id. 
165 Compare Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 236 (4th 
Cir. 2006) with B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905 
(11th Cir. 2006). The Fourth Circuit found that the arbitrator’s interpretation 
was unreasonable as the legal rule was unambiguous; consequently, the court 
found that there was evidence of manifest disregard. Patten, 441 F.3d at 230.  
However, the Eleventh Circuit would not find evidence of manifest disregard if 
the arbitrator made a legal error, much less an unreasonable finding. Harbert, 
441 F.3d at 905. 
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accept challenges to arbitration awards. 
Rather than feeling more confident about arbitration, parties 
will feel less confident as a result of the inconsistencies amongst 
the circuits. First, parties may be unable to predict the standard of 
manifest disregard that would potentially be applied to their case 
when entering into an arbitration agreement. Second, parties may 
not be able to predict whether they will be susceptible to 
sanctions. Third, because of the lack of guidance with regard to 
judicial appeals, parties may no longer be persuaded by the allure 
of a quick and inexpensive method of dispute resolution.  
The only way to dispel the confusion plaguing the courts, 
attorneys and potential parties to arbitration is to have a uniform 
standard describing exactly what constitutes manifest disregard and 
what evidence is needed to bring a successful appeal based on 
manifest disregard of the law. Although sanctions may help 
promote confidence in the arbitration process after a standard is 
established, sanctions will only serve to intimidate parties from 
participating in arbitration if inconsistent standards remain in place. 
Arbitration will lose its appeal because sanctions will upset the 
balance between the benefits of a quick and inexpensive method of 
resolution and the goal of obtaining a just resolution that was 
formerly achieved through the possibility of judicial appeal. 
B.  The Side-Effects 
The lack of a uniform application of the doctrine of manifest 
disregard within the circuit courts has the potential to lead to a 
number of undesirable outcomes. First, if the circuits adopt unclear 
standards without invoking a penalty for meritless claims, the poor 
loser syndrome166 may arise. In other words, parties dissatisfied 
with an arbitration award may appeal weak or even meritless 
claims on the assumption that they have nothing to lose. Further, 
these “poor losers” may even win their appeals since it is unclear 
how the court will evaluate their claim. Second, parties may be 
fearful of participating in arbitration because they will not feel 
secure in the judicial safety net supporting this method of dispute 
                                                           
166 See Dreiling, supra note 162, at 2. 
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resolution. Parties will be hesitant to participate in arbitration from 
the outset if they feel constrained in the availability of judicial 
appeals because of the threat of sanctions. Finally, circuits may 
develop applications of the doctrine of manifest disregard that do 
not conform to one another, as we have seen here with the Fourth 
and Eleventh Circuit. If this trend continues to develop, parties will 
engage in forum shopping: participating in arbitration agreements 
only in forums that they view as favorable based on the circuit’s 
application of the manifest disregard doctrine. All of these 
potential developments will be detrimental to the judicial system 
and all can be averted if the Supreme Court intervenes and sets 
forth a clear standard of how courts are to apply the doctrine of 
manifest disregard. 
1.  “Poor Loser”167 Syndrome 
While the Eleventh Circuit’s threat of sanctions may dissuade 
arbitration because parties have the potential to feel that the 
balance between a just, inexpensive and swift resolution is skewed, 
the Fourth Circuit’s approach may have the same exact result for 
the opposite reason. This is because the Fourth Circuit’s standard 
opens the door to the “poor loser” syndrome.168 Therefore, 
although Patten lowers the probability of an unjust resolution, the 
decision jeopardizes the opportunity for a speedy and inexpensive 
resolution. 
The threat of “poor loser” appeals is a real concern for some 
parties considering arbitration. The attorney who represented 
Hercules Steel in Harbert was featured in an ABA synopsis of the 
“poor loser” syndrome and was quoted as saying, “It seems that 
more and more over the last several years, ‘sore losers’ have been 
running to the courts to try to get arbitration awards vacated . . . it 
is really a ray of sunshine to see the courts stand up and say 
arbitration is a good thing.”169 In this respect, manifest disregard 
has been characterized as a tool with which losers can “disrupt the 
                                                           
167 Harbert, 441 F.3d at 907. 
168 See id. at 907 (asserting that if courts were to not impose sanctions, they 
would be encouraging poor losers to appeal unfavorable arbitration awards). 
169 Dreiling, supra note 162, at 2. 
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arbitral process.”170 Individuals with this viewpoint are pleased 
when courts refrain from analyzing anything except for the 
“fundamental procedural integrity” of the arbitration process.171 
2.  Discouraging the use of arbitration 
For arbitration to be a successful method of alternative dispute 
resolution, parties must begin to perceive arbitration awards as a 
judicially sanctioned resolution. Accordingly, while there are 
inherent risks in arbitration,172 parties would recognize that 
arbitration is founded on legal principals, and violations of these 
principals will be reviewed by courts. It is important to remember 
that “arbitrators are not restricted to individuals trained in the law 
or a particular area of expertise.”173 This is important to keep in 
mind because while parties enter into arbitration knowing that they 
have agreed to have their dispute settled by a third party, they are 
also entering into arbitration with the knowledge that it is a 
resolution process sanctioned by courts. If parties become fearful 
that the judicial appeals process is unavailable because of the threat 
of sanctions, as from the Eleventh Circuit, these parties may elect 
not to participate in arbitration; without this safeguard, the risks of 
arbitration may outweigh its benefits. 
One might argue that the Eleventh Circuit left the door open for 
successful manifest disregard appeals and therefore did not 
undermine the faith that parties to arbitration place in the legal 
basis of an arbitrator’s decision. However, one only need look at 
the intent of the Eleventh Circuit to predict the impact that its 
decision will likely have. The Eleventh Circuit wanted to restrict 
appeals of arbitration awards based on manifest disregard.174 In 
                                                           
170 Park, supra note 54. 
171 Park, supra note 54. 
172 See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache T Servs., 341 F.3d 987, 1003 
(9th Cir. 2003). 
173 Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of 
Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 450–51 
(2004). 
 174  B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 913 
(11th Cir. 2006). 
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accomplishing this goal and intimidating unwarranted appeals with 
the threat of sanctions, it is likely that, as a byproduct, the court 
will also discourage the filing of bona fide appeals. While only the 
future can tell, it seems to be a natural repercussion that, with 
sanctions at stake, parties will be hesitant to appeal arbitration 
awards even if these parties feel their awards were unjust. 
Under the Eleventh Circuit test, parties can only appeal in very 
limited circumstances: they must be able to show that the arbitrator 
knew the law and intentionally did not apply it.175 Because there is 
no requirement that arbitrators document their reasoning,176 the 
Eleventh Circuit’s standard may be very difficult to meet. 
Although parties may accept this risk when they agree to arbitrate, 
it seems to present a conflict: How can courts support an 
arbitration model which restricts the checks and balances of 
arbitration to such an extent that an award appearing to have been 
made in disregard of the law can only be appealed under the threat 
of sanctions? 
3.  Forum Shopping 
The lack of a uniform application of the manifest disregard 
standard has created an atmosphere ripe for forum shopping. 
Parties will be motivated to search for jurisdictions with, as in the 
Eleventh Circuit, clear and favorable applications of the manifest 
disregard doctrine. This invitation to forum shop is problematic 
because it allows for domestic and international exploitation of 
inconsistencies in the arbitration process. Indeed, in international 
arbitration, manifest disregard “gives the United States a 
competitive disadvantage compared to arbitral venues where 
judicial intervention is limited to matters related to fundamental 
procedural integrity.”177 Given the substantial increase in the 
United States’ participation in international arbitration over the 
                                                           
175 Id. 
176 Gaitis, supra note 13 at 16 (describing differing standards for arbitration 
proceedings, including the AAA preference for proceedings that do not contain 
documentation of the reasoning behind the arbitrator’s award). 
177 Park, supra note 54.  
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past decade,178 the potential for a backlash over courts applying 
manifest disregard to international awards should be a concern to 
those who want the United States to continue its prominent role as 
an the arbitration forum.179 
IV.  WHERE ARE WE NOW AND WHAT CAN WE EXPECT? 
Because of the increased importance of arbitration, it is timely 
for the court to hear a manifest disregard case and impose a clear 
standard for what circuits should consider when analyzing such 
appeals. This will prevent the confusion, poor loser syndrome, and 
forum shopping that are inherent with the current status of the 
manifest disregard doctrine. However, it does not appear that the 
Supreme Court is willing to hear a manifest disregard case at this 
time. 180 Signator Insurance Agency appealed to the Supreme Court 
for a writ of certiorari regarding the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ application of manifest disregard of the law to overturn 
the arbitrator’s award in the arbitration between Patten and 
Signator.181 However, on October 16, 2006, the Supreme Court 
denied the petition for a writ of certiorari.182 
The Supreme Court’s decision to deny the petition for 
certiorari requested by Signator Insurance is surprising given the 
disparity in the application of manifest disregard amongst the 
circuits, and the evident distinction between the Patten Court and 
the other circuits as indicated by language used in the Patten 
decision. Patten is unique in that the Fourth Circuit explicitly 
stated that it determined the arbitrator’s award was in manifest 
                                                           
178 Drahozal, supra note 26, at 244. 
179 See Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 12. The authors suggest that 
because courts in the United States use manifest disregard and therefore evaluate 
arbitration awards on their merits, international parties to arbitration will be 
hesitant to enter into arbitration that falls under the jurisdiction of the United 
States. Id. It would appear that, from the authors’ points of view the Harbert 
court’s approach to arbitration awards would be more pleasing to international 
parties than would the Patten court’s approach. 
180 Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2006), 
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 434 (2006). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
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disregard because it was “not reasonable”183 to carry the one year 
statute of limitations from the first arbitration agreement over to 
the second arbitration agreement.184 This statement has been 
singled out by legal commentators and academics as a distinguishing 
characteristic that makes the case ripe for certiorari review by the 
Supreme Court.185 Perhaps the Court does not find it troubling that 
the appellate court overturned the arbitrator’s award because the 
Court did not want Patten to be the test case. When weighing the 
interests of arbitration and justice, the Court may have decided that 
it is more important to have a result that is just from a legal 
standpoint than a result that was procured by a quick and 
inexpensive method of dispute resolution. 
Whatever the reason behind the Court’s decision to deny 
Signator’s petition for a writ of certiorari, one thing is clear: The 
confusion that currently exists in the circuits as to the correct 
standard for applying manifest disregard of the law to arbitration 
awards will not be resolved this year. Consequently, the poor loser 
syndrome will continue, arbitration participants and their attorneys 
will be at a disadvantage when weighing their options for appeal, 
and the threat of the possible exploitation of manifest disregard in 
the context of forum shopping will continue at both the domestic 
and international level. 
 
                                                           
183 Id. at 236. 
 184  Id. 
185 See Ross’s Arbitration Blog, http://www.lawmemo.com/arbitration 
blog/2006/08/manifest_disreg_1.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (question #2 
for the Supreme Court: “Whether (in conflict with the decisions of at least eight 
other federal courts of appeals) a court may vacate an arbitrator’s award for not 
‘drawing its essence from the agreement’ on the ground that the arbitrator 
construed an ‘unambiguous’ contract in a way that is ‘not reasonable’?”); see 
also, Workplace Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/ 
2006/08/cert_request_ch.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (“The petition was 
spurred by a ruling [by the Fourth Circuit in Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency et 
al.] that endorsed vacating an award where an arbitrator’s decision was ‘not 
reasonable’ based on the terms of a contract.”). 
